

Creation
Social Science and Humanities
QUARTERLY



EDITORIAL

Dear Readers,

Several months ago one of my colleagues sent a student to me. It seems that the young woman's Christian faith was being shaken by some of the ideas regarding evolution that were being taught in one of her classes. The professor, though a non-believer and very much committed to the theory of evolution, was nevertheless sympathetic to the girl's suffering and so brought her to speak with me. I did speak with her briefly, and later she enrolled in one of my university classes. It turned out that her grandfather had also been a committed Christian and had once even authored a poem regarding the creation/evolution controversy. (This poem appears on page 29.) It was a great joy to me to have a part in supporting the young student's confidence in the wisdom of her grandfather and also be an instrument in upholding her faith at a crucial juncture in her Christian walk. Praise be to God for such opportunities.

The commencement of the *Creation Social Science and Humanities Quarterly* marks the opening of another front in what Harold Lindsell has rightly called, *The Battle For the Bible*. Our intention is best stated in II Corinthians 10:3-5:

For though we walk in the flesh, we do not war after the flesh: (For the weapons of our warfare are not carnal, but mighty through God to the pulling down of strong holds;) Casting down imaginations, and every high thing that exalteth itself against the knowledge of God, and bringing into captivity every thought to the obedience of Christ.

As we begin this effort the incident with the young student speaks to my heart in a number of ways. It speaks to me in answering the question of why we seek to destroy the "high imagination" of evolution. First, of course, we seek to glorify Christ. But also we seek to minister to the saints. We hope to do this in the sense of protecting the true faith of saints, past, present and future.

We also hope to play a role in the Great Commission to share the Gospel with a lost world. I was and still am touched by the compassion of the evolutionist professor. He certainly did not have to bring the young student to me. Nevertheless he saw fit to do so. Let us pray that God will teach us ways to communicate the Gospel in power to such individuals.

With these general considerations in mind I would speak to the specifics of the journal's mission as follows: As I now envision the scope of the *CSSHS Quarterly*, it would focus on the relationships of the most general of Biblical creation aspects to various problems in the social sciences and humanities. For example, we would emphasize the fact of Divine creation rather than the Scriptural details regarding it, or the Fall in general, rather than details of its

(cont. on p. 32.)

CREATION SOCIAL SCIENCE AND HUMANITIES SOCIETY

The Creation Social Science and Humanities Society (CSSHS) was incorporated in Wichita, Kansas, in 1977. The CSSHS is educational, and will promote and disseminate information on the implications of the Biblical creation model of origins for the social sciences and humanities, with emphasis on the development of these disciplines in accordance with the rapidly emerging and increasingly well established natural scientific models of Biblical creation.

This Quarterly Journal is directed toward teachers and students of the social sciences and humanities, especially in institutions of higher learning. The CSSHS may also publish books, monographs, and other writings, and sponsor speakers, seminars, and research projects related to its educational purpose.

IRS tax-exempt status was granted December 30, 1977. All contributions are tax-deductible.

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METAPHOR: AN EVIDENCE FROM DESIGN OF THE CREATION MODEL

Kathy Lynn Hutson

INTRODUCTION

Metaphor has become the Cinderella of literary analysis — a rather dramatic and self-consciously metaphorical summation, perhaps, but nevertheless true in light of metaphor's increasing dominance in studies ranging from literary criticism to the philosophical realms of epistemology and ontology. This previously unheralded figure of speech has increasingly been recognized as a central element in literature, especially poetry, as reflected in C. Day Lewis's remark that "metaphor remains the life-principle of poetry, the poet's chief test and glory."¹ But what has made the transformation of this Cinderella so "magical" is its rise and dominance as a principle of language and thought. In this broader view, metaphor is used as a synonym for figurative thought processes. Men have long understood and explained newly-perceived objects in terms of previously-known objects. And they have sought consistently for higher truths, the unseen reality, the noumenal, within the framework of the earthly, the seen, the phenomenal. "Metaphor is as ultimate as speech itself," writes John Middleton Murry, "and speech as ultimate as thought."² Rhetoricians and philosophers alike have begun to uncover the complexity and significance of metaphor as a common but heretofore underestimated element of man's thought and expression. I.A. Richards has called metaphor the "omnipresent principle of language."³ Indeed, poets breathe it; philosophers grudgingly fall back on it; politicians and propagandists abuse it; and the man on the street brandishes it freely, sometimes faultily, and often unknowingly.

What is this universal element of literature and principle of language, the complexity of which is only now being realized? What does this figure of speech say about the mind of man? Is metaphor merely a linguistic mirage, a poetic plaything, or is it a reliable key to acquiring more knowledge of the phenomenal and true knowledge of the noumenal? Is it reasonable that a facet of the art and thought of man so complex could arise as a product of matter, chance selection, and time? The existence of such a rich aspect of human language, *of which man himself has largely been unaware*, is a testimony to an intelligent and personal Creator. The metaphorical nature of men's art and thought is an element in the design of the creature called man.

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that metaphor, both as an element of literature and as a principle of language and thought, is an evi-

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dence from design of the creation model of origins. The method of this study will be to first define metaphor and examine the major views of its nature and purpose. A brief treatment of the creation model and the term "evidence from design" will follow. Finally, metaphor's role as an evidence from design of the creation model as against the evolution model can be displayed. This portion of the paper will include a presentation of the creation model of the origin of language and metaphor, and will conclude with some practical applications of the results of the study.

I. DEFINITION OF METAPHOR

Most high school grammar students learn of simile and metaphor as comparison, the former using "like" or "as" in a direct statement of resemblance, and the latter being indirect by virtue of omitting the overt connective. This treatment of metaphor is useful for some purposes, but the term has been both more accurately defined as a figure of speech and more broadly applied as a principle of language and thought.

A. AS AN ELEMENT OF LITERATURE

Metaphor is defined in the *Oxford English Dictionary* as "a figure of speech in which a name or descriptive term is transferred to some object different from but analogous to that to which it is properly applicable."⁴ There are at least three essential parts of metaphor revealed in this definition: two ideas or objects and their analogous relationship when used figuratively. Unfortunately, students of metaphor have not established a standard terminology for these parts of a metaphor, a fact which has produced confusion but which also reflects the variety of their views of the nature of metaphorical expression. A brief survey of these views will be helpful in understanding the complexity of metaphor as a figure of speech and in getting acquainted with its various aspects.

It is traditional to begin with the *Poetics of Aristotle* as the first writings which deal systematically with metaphor. Of his view, which has been labeled the "analogy view" of metaphor, he writes:

Metaphor by analogy means this: when B is to A as D is to C, then instead of B the poet will say D and B instead of D . . . For instance . . . old age is to life as evening is to day; so he will call the evening "day's old age" . . . and old age he will call "the evening of life" or "life's setting sun."⁵

Thus, for Aristotle and for writers centuries afterward, metaphor was simply an artistic analogy.

One must then come all the way to the modern period to find a significant development of metaphorical theory. Stephen Brown dealt extensively in the 1920's with the then-undeveloped theory of metaphor. He defined metaphor

"as an attempt to express in terms of experience thoughts lying beyond experience, to express the abstract in terms of the concrete . . . to express insensuous thought by sensuous terms."⁶ Here, Brown describes the element of metaphor which makes more clear in concrete terms what may be unclear in abstract terms. The familiar phrase "no man is an island," as a kind of negative metaphor, is an example of Brown's view. The abstract idea that a man is not isolated from the rest of humanity is transferred to the concrete image of an island. In Brown's terminology "man" is labeled the main idea of the metaphor; "island," the imported image; and the relationship of the two, the scope of the resemblance.⁷ To restate the metaphor positively in terms of Aristotle's analogy view would be to say "man is to humanity what a part of the continent is to the continent as a whole." Brown's view expanded the analogy view into an overall scheme of resemblances, which allowed for greater clarity and impact.

Ten years later I.A. Richards coined the term "interaction" as a description of metaphor. "In the simplest formulation," he states, "when we use a metaphor we have two thoughts of different things active together and supported by a single word or phrase, whose meaning is a resultant of their interaction."⁸ Richards' work has had great impact on the modern view of metaphor and has been employed by many modern critics and educators.⁹ To discuss Richards' terms it will be useful to use Max Black's example "man is a wolf." "Man," according to Richards, is the tenor of the metaphor; and "wolf," the vehicle. These are the "two thoughts of different things" which then interact to produce the "resultant meaning."¹⁰ Richards' main contribution is that the interaction involved is not between two words, but between thoughts, "a transaction between contexts," which affects the meaning of both elements.¹¹

Max Black, a prominent contemporary scholar, has embraced Richards' interaction theory with some qualifications and useful elaborations. For reasons not suitable to this discussion, Black renamed the tenor the "principal subject" and called the vehicle the "subsidiary subject"; but more importantly, he added the concept of "a system of associated commonplaces."¹² Black explains that in order to understand the metaphor "man is a wolf," the reader must know not only the dictionary definition of wolf, but also a whole complex of ideas that are commonly associated with wolves. It is when this system of associated commonplaces surrounding the subsidiary subject (wolf) are applied to the principal subject (man) that the intent of the metaphorical expression is realized. Black also points out that any part of speech can be used metaphorically, a fact which many definitions leave unclear.¹³

Another useful contribution made by Black is his categorization of the various views of metaphor. The "comparison view," according to Black, holds that a metaphor simply presents an underlying comparison or analogy, that it is, in effect, a condensed simile. Aristotle would fit into this category. Brown would be an example of the "substitution view" of metaphor, which holds that the metaphor is used *in place of* some equivalent literal expression; i.e., Brown's "concrete" would be substituted for the "abstract." The third class of metaphor is the "interaction view" which is best defined by Richards' defini-

tion above. Black considers it the comprehensive and superior view, but criticizes Richards for sometimes lapsing into aspects of the comparison view.¹⁴

A central aspect of metaphor which has not yet been emphasized is the disparate nature of the two subjects, "the two different things" of Richards' definition. In the metaphor above "man," the principal subject, is categorically different from "wolf," the subsidiary subject.

This is what Douglas Berggren has called the "semantic transgression" necessary to metaphor.¹⁵ According to Berggren, a metaphor is a bringing together of two subjects from completely different linguistic categories, i.e., an unexpected association. In Aristotle's example, to associate a man's life with the progress of a literal day is to cross the semantic boundaries that separate the two. Of course this "semantic transgression," or "semantic motion," as Wheelwright has called it,¹⁶ must be recognized as such, or the reader will mistake the metaphor for a literal assertion. Thus, Jack Deere has defined metaphor as "a deliberate transgression of semantic boundaries which is meaningful, but cannot be construed literally."¹⁷

Some other considerations in understanding metaphor are the broader use of the term and the different kinds of metaphor that have developed. First, metaphor has been used broadly as a term for figurative language as a whole, including simile, personification, metonymy and synecdoche.¹⁸ As such, it has expanded application to figurative thinking, as well as language, which will be discussed later. Second, some broad categories of metaphor are useful in realizing the predominance of metaphor in language. For simplicity, there are three basic kinds: 1) dead, 2) radical or necessary, and 3) poetical. "Dead" metaphor is the name applied to those figures which have been used until the metaphoric nature of their origin is forgotten or not readily recognized by the speaker.¹⁹ An amazing number of words in the English language in regular literal usage are actually dead or dying metaphors, so much so that Michel Breal labeled the average vocabulary a "metaphor museum."²⁰ For example, when someone says the "leg of the table" or the "hood of a car" he is seldom conscious, nor is his listener, that the phrases were originally metaphorical and are now considered dead metaphors. Dead metaphors are frequently classed as idioms. Some metaphors are born because there is no literal expression available for their meaning. These have been called "radical" metaphors, or some have suggested "necessary," because they are truly necessary to express the thought.²¹ This kind of metaphor has interesting philosophic implications which will be viewed in section three. Finally, "poetic" metaphor is the title given the most familiar category of metaphor, that which is "the life-principle of poetry." One can hardly find a poem in which some type of metaphor has not been employed. As Quintillian has asserted, poets may find metaphor valuable for any number of purposes: for explanation (intellectual value), for impact (emotional value), for ornament (aesthetic value), or for all three.²²

To sum up, metaphor can be viewed as a complex element of literature, the definition and influence of which is ever-broadening. In light of this, Max Black's categorization of the definitions of metaphor into comparison, substi-

tution and interaction views is a useful means to see this development and to relate these views. However, it is not so much necessary in this discussion to decide the relative merits of these definitions and classifications as it is to see them as a development of men's awareness of the various aspects of the metaphors they use. In other words, theories of metaphor are having to grow to encompass the sophistication of the metaphors in use. This points up the complexity of metaphor simply as a figure of speech, a complexity of which rhetoricians are only now becoming aware. Richards sums this up beautifully.

To improve the theory of metaphor we must take more note of the skill in thought which we possess and are intermittently aware of already. We must translate more of our skill into discussable science. Reflect better upon what we do already so cleverly.²³

B. AS A PRINCIPLE OF LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT

As well as being an element in literature, metaphor, as Murry put it, "is as ultimate as speech itself." Brown speaks of metaphor as "leading us to the very roots of language";²⁴ and Richards, as the "omnipresent principle of language." "A compendium of figurative language," writes Weller Embler, "would include very nearly all words."²⁵ But language is married to thought, and thus Brown can rightfully conclude that a thorough examination of metaphor would constitute an investigation of the very genesis of thought.²⁶ As seen in the previous section, metaphor is basically analogical, in the sense that it is the "repetition of the same fundamental pattern in two different contexts."²⁷ By realizing that metaphorical thinking is actually analogical thinking, it becomes more apparent how much of man's thought, as both rhetoricians and philosophers are discovering, boils down to metaphor. From words describing metaphysical theories and explanations of unseen realities all the way to everyday words for unseen experiences, most are based on analogies with sensory data, the concrete, the phenomenal; they are metaphorical. Wheelwright, whose *Metaphor and Reality* reveals the over-arching influence of metaphor, has asserted that the basic archetypal symbols of history are extensions of metaphoric activity, and that language and thought are utterly dependent on it.²⁸ And it is Wheelwright, among rhetoricians, who then peers even further into the philosophical ramifications and concludes that metaphorical or poetic language "partly creates and partly discloses certain hitherto unknown, unguessed aspects of What Is."²⁹ The study of What Is, or ontology, has long been a study of metaphysicians and even of a school of metaphysical poets, but these assertions of the dependence of ontology on language constitute a controversial proclamation. Richards states it another way:

Language, well-used, is a completion, and does what the intuition of sensations cannot do. Words are . . . the occasion and the means of

that growth which is the mind's endless endeavor to order itself. This is why we have language . . . They [T.E. Hulme and others] think the [sensory] image fills in the meaning of the word; it is rather . . . the word which brings in the meaning which the image and its original perception lack.³⁰

And Wheelwright adds, "Semantics and ontology are inseparable; the first is superficial without the second, which in turn is unintelligible without the first."³¹

However, the controversy lies in that there is a simultaneous fear among thinkers of the conclusions which derive from this ontological dependence. Black, in fact, begins one of his books by implying that philosophers consider it a commandment, "Thou shalt not commit metaphor," and assume that metaphor is incompatible with philosophical conclusions.³² An interesting note, however, is that language historians have long taught that words or descriptions of intellectual operations have all been taken, by metaphor, from a description of some physical happening, as Richards points out. "Only Jeremy Bentham," he writes, "as successor to Bacon and Hobbes, insisted . . . upon one inference that might be drawn (from this intellectual dependence upon metaphor); namely, that the mind and all its doings are fictions."³³ This fear, that there is no ultimate correlation between man's metaphorical language and reality, between semantics and ontology, between the truth derived from metaphor and the Truth, is best summarized by C. S. Lewis.

I said at the outset that the truth we won by metaphor could not be greater than the truth of the metaphor itself; and we have seen since that all our truth, or all but a few fragments, is won by metaphor. And thence, I confess, it does follow that if our thinking is ever true, then the metaphors by which we think must have been good metaphors. It does follow that if those original equations, between good and light, or evil and dark, between breath and soul and all the others, were from the beginning arbitrary and fanciful—if there is not, in fact, a kind of psycho-physical parallelism (or more) in the universe—then all our thinking is nonsensical.³⁴

In addition, then, to the complexity of metaphor as merely a figure of speech, it has figured as the prominent principle of language that makes language a master, rather than a servant, of thought. While rhetoricians, by and large, have understandably embraced this centrality of metaphor because it exalts language, philosophers have been wary of the ontological conclusions it leaves in its wake. Does human language have any true correlation with What Is, the true nature of reality? Is there a "psycho-physical parallelism" in the universe, or are "the mind and all its doings fictions?" The answers to these questions will be discussed in Section III as indicative of the teleological role of metaphor.

II. DEFINITION OF CREATION AND EVIDENCE FROM DESIGN

Before proceeding further into the implications of metaphor in a discussion of origins, it is necessary to briefly define the creation model and the concept of "evidence from design," or teleology.

A. DEFINITION OF CREATION MODEL

One of the leading creation scientists, Henry Morris, describes a "model" as a "conceptual framework, an orderly system of thought, within which one tries to correlate observable data, and even to predict data."³⁵ He adds that two models, in this case the creation and the evolution model, can be compared on the basis of which one can better correlate the data.³⁶

The creation model, as a scientific model, has seven basic characteristics, as described by Morris:³⁷

- 1) supernaturalistic
- 2) externally directed (allowing for catastrophism)
- 3) completed
- 4) purposive
- 5) directional (downward, not upward)
- 6) irreversible
- 7) universal

To these he adds that God's special creation was followed by "processes of conservation" which are designed to maintain the "basic systems" He had created.³⁸ For this discussion, Morris's three summary characteristics and their evolution model counterparts will be helpful in organizing a view of language's relationship to origins. His summary includes:

- 1) Completed supernatural origin (in contrast to evolution's continuing naturalism)
- 2) Net present decrease in complexity (in contrast to evolution's increase in complexity)
- 3) Earth history dominated by catastrophism (specific evidences of the "externally directed" aspect of creation in contrast to the self-contained uniformitarianism of the evolution model)³⁹

These three principles are and will be applied to the problems and significance of the metaphoric nature of language.

B. DEFINITION OF EVIDENCE FROM DESIGN

The question of whether metaphor can then be considered an evidence from design of the creation model requires an understanding also of what constitutes an "evidence from design." An earlier creation scientist, Paul Zimmerman, and many others, simply state that the complex phenomena of nature are so well-designed that it is more reasonable to presume an intelligent Creator than a slow development guided by chance.⁴⁰

Viewing nature as ■■■ evidence of intelligent creatorship has ■ long history among thinkers, both scientist and non-scientist. Its earliest evidences are found in the teleological approach of Aristotle and continue to the modern period in the writings of William Paley (1743-1805), who pointed to the complexity of body organs ■■■ surpassing that of man-made precision instruments, the former no more capable of evolving than the latter.⁴¹

However, as presuppositional apologetics points out, the force of the classical view of "evidence from design" works only because the universe is what the Word of God says it is. Evidence from design by itself, therefore, cannot prove the creation model, strictly speaking; it can only illustrate the glory of God in His creation and put pressure on adherents of the evolution model to view the alternative that God's Word declares the truth in this ■■■■■ and to reconsider their own interpretations.

One final note regards the legitimacy of considering metaphor as ■■■ element of design at all. Some might object that, as ■ part of language, metaphor is a creation of man, and thus could no more be an evidence from design than ■ skyscraper. However, the statement that language and all its parts ■■■ the creation of man is itself ■ presupposition — ■ presupposition which is not based upon empirical data such ■■■ historic records or archeological data, but upon a belief in the evolution model, and is not supported by presently available linguistic data. The creation model's presupposition is that language is ■ product of the Creator, ■ presupposition based on belief in the creation model but supported by historic eyewitness records and undisputed by presently available linguistic data. These assertions will be explained in Section III.

(We will feature the conclusion of this article in the winter issue of the CSSHS Quarterly.)

FOOTNOTES

- ¹ Philip Wheelwright, *Metaphor and Reality* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1967), p. 67.
- ² *Ibid.*, p. 69.
- ³ I.A. Richards, *The Philosophy of Rhetoric* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1936), p. 92.
- ⁴ *Oxford English Dictionary*.
- ⁵ Aristotle, *Poetics*, 21. 11-14
- ⁶ Stephen J. Brown, *The World of Imagery* (New York: Russell and Russell, 1927), p. 33.
- ⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 48.
- ⁸ Richards, *op.cit.*, p. 93.
- ⁹ Richards' terminology appears frequently in modern textbooks, such as the college creative writing text *Three Genres* by Stephen Minot.

¹⁰ Richards, *op. cit.*, p. 96.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 94.

¹² Max Black, *Models and Metaphors* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1962), p. 44.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 28.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

¹⁵ Douglas Charles Berggren, "An Analysis of Metaphorical Meaning and Truth" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Yale University, 1959), p. 374.

¹⁶ Wheelwright, *op. cit.*, p. 71-72.

¹⁷ Jack S. Deere, "Metaphor in the Song of Songs" (Th.M thesis, Dallas Theological Seminary, 1975), p. 14.

¹⁸ Brown, *op. cit.*, p. 26 and *Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary*.

¹⁹ Brown (*op. cit.*, p. 38) has called this a "fossil metaphor"; Brinkman, and "incarnate metaphor"; and others, "frozen metaphor" (Deere, p. 22).

²⁰ Brown, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

²¹ Max Muller, cited in Brown, p. 19.

²² As cited in Brown, p. 58.

²³ Richards, *op. cit.* p. 94.

²⁴ Brown, p. 26.

²⁵ Weller Embler, *Metaphor and Meaning* (DeLand, FA: Everett/ Edwards, Inc., 1966), p. 37.

²⁶ Brown, p. 12.

²⁷ Dorothy M. Emmett, *The Nature of Metaphysical Thinking* (London: MacMillan and Co., LTD., 1953) p. 6.

²⁸ Wheelwright, p. 127-128.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 51.

³⁰ Richards, p. 130-131.

³¹ Wheelwright, p. 20.

³² Black, p. 25.

³³ Richards, p. 91.

³⁴ C. S. Lewis, "Bluspels and Flalansferes," *The Importance of Language*, ed. Max Black (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962), p. 50.

³⁵ Henry M. Morris, *Scientific Creationism* (San Diego, CA: Creation Life Publishers, 1974), p. 9.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

⁴⁰ Paul A. Zimmerman, *Darwin, Evolution, and Creation* (Concordia Publishing House: St. Louis, MO, 1959), p. 83.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 8, 17.

⁴² Percy Bysshe Shelley, cited in Wheelwright, p. 82.

CANDLE IN THE WIND: A TRIBUTE TO ALEXANDR SOLZHENITSYN

Ellen Myers

Someone has said that "the Christian understanding of creation, the fall, and redemption underlies Solzhenitsyn's writing; he has accepted this analysis."¹

Alexandr Solzhenitsyn tells us that he came to faith in the Creator "God of the Universe"² by the road of intellectual arrogance and lust for power, descending in prison to the "edge between being and nothingness"³ where he "renounced that aim of surviving at any price"⁴ and went "where the calm and simple people go."⁵ After listening to a prison doctor's "long story of his conversion from Judaism to Christianity, . . . his last words on earth," Solzhenitsyn knew that "you cannot brush off that kind of inheritance by shrugging your shoulders."⁶ And so Solzhenitsyn returned to God as the Creator of man and therefore giver of man's meaning:

Not with good judgment nor with desire
Are its (life's) twists and turns illumined.
But with the even glow of the Higher Meaning
Which became apparent to me only later on.
And now with measuring cup returned to me
Scooping up the living water,
God of the Universe! I believe again!

Though I renounced You, You were with me!⁷

By his faith Solzhenitsyn is to Soviet Russia, and to the entire twentieth century world, a voice crying in the wilderness of materialism, a candle in the wind of humanist atheism. The voice cries out: "Morality is higher than law! . . . This view must never be abandoned. We must accept it with heart and soul . . . words like 'good' and 'evil' . . . are concepts from a sphere which is higher than us."⁸ The voice commands: "*DO NOT LIE! DO NOT TAKE PART IN THE LIE! DO NOT SUPPORT THE LIE!*"⁹

The candle is the light of Christ in the human heart, according to the Bible passage Solzhenitsyn proclaims through his stand-in, Aunt Christine, at the climax of his drama, *Candle in the Wind*:

No man, when he hath lighted a candle, putteth it in a secret place, neither under a bushel, but on a candlestick, that they which come in may see the light . . . Take heed therefore that the light which is in thee be not darkness . . .

And in his cry against materialism, he has Aunt Christine quote again from the Bible:

And I will say to my soul, Soul, thou hast much goods laid up for many years; take thine ease, eat, drink, and be merry. But God said

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unto him, Thou fool, this night thy soul shall be required of thee:
then whose shall those things be, which thou has provided?¹⁰

For all his deep rejection of Communism, and encyclopedic knowledge of its atrocities documented in the nearly 1300 pages of the four completed (at this writing) volumes of *The Gulag Archipelago*, Solzhenitsyn does not people his works of fiction with stereotyped communist or anti-communist puppets. The nearest he comes to tailoring characters according to the views they represent is in *Candle in the Wind*. Yet its hero Alex is ■ living, complex man, not a robot of manufactured single-minded virtue and wisdom.

The mark of truth and value in man is not to seek vengeance, but repentence and reconciliation. Solzhenitsyn, prophet and teacher rather than rebel and revolutionary, shows this in the following exchange between Alex and the African student Kabimba, who is angry and disillusioned with the research institute for which both work:

Kabimba: . . . They're all rich and totally unconcerned, they'll never be able to understand how other people live! I hate myself for clinging to them! I hate them all!

Alex: Kabimba! You know I've also fallen hopelessly behind them because of the time I spent in prison. So what am I to do now? Elbow them aside? Smash their windows? Kabimba! Hatred and resentment will never get you anywhere. They ■■■ the most barren feelings in the world. One has to rise above that and realize that ■■■ have lost centuries or decades — we've been insulted, humiliated, but that's no reason for revenge. Nor should we try. All the ■■■ we're richer than they are.

Kabimba (indignantly): We are? Richer in what way? In what way?

Alex: Because we've suffered, Kabimba. Suffering is ■ lever for the growth of the soul. A contented person always has ■■■ impoverished soul. It's our job to build little by little.¹¹

The "heroine" Alda is a most unheroic victim of her own pliable nature. The representative of shameless hedonism, Professor Maurice Craig, reduced in his old age to playing cook and housekeeper to his young, career-crazy, oversexed wife Tillie, evokes our pity along with our contempt. The messenger of Biblical Christianity, ragged Aunt Christine herself, shelters "how many cats . . . nine ■■■ ten? ■■■ seems kind of ■ lot."¹², appearing thereby foolish and contemptible to the shallow worldly-minded. Lest Tillie Craig seem too one-sided and shrill, a parody of the modern liberated woman, Solzhenitsyn also portrays in laboratory chief Annie Banigge a gentler human being who can still reject cruelty, feel ashamed at taking ■ husband away from his paralyzed wife, and cry all night.¹³ The most puppet-like characters in *Candle* are the members of the "bio-cybernetic team," and we may assume that they are themselves the first victims of their own conditioning by scientific elimination of human emotions as proper expressions of rightful value judgments.¹⁴

What a wealth of living men and women do we find in Solzhenitsyn's panoramic novels! Their very length and explicit details become a joy as we look

forward to meeting the "lesser" people along with the principal ones! In *A Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich* we love not only Ivan himself but also his meek and serene Baptist friend Alyosha: "What was he so pleased about? His cheeks were sunken, he lived only on his ration and didn't earn anything extra . . . He always did whatever you asked. If only everybody in the world was like that, Shukhov would be that way too."¹⁵ In *The First Circle* we admire not only its chief protagonist Nerzhin, but the marvelous hero Gerasimovich. He wears ■ pince-nez, ■■■ "very narrow in the shoulders and very small," with a "thin dried-up face," as he turns down a comfortable job building listening devices for the GPU and possible early release, and chooses instead certain death by starvation and freezing in an arctic prison and final separation from his wife. Why? Because "Putting people in prison is not my field! I don't set traps for human beings! It's bad enough they put us in prison . . ."¹⁶ Examples from the above and other works could be multiplied.

Perhaps the most moving story by Solzhenitsyn is *Cancer Ward*. Immediately we are introduced to Communist Pavel Nikolayevich Rusanov entering "wing 13" with superstitious dislike. "It isn't, it isn't cancer, is it, Doctor? I haven't got cancer?" we hear him stammer ■ we ■■■ him touch "the malevolent tumor on the right side of his neck."¹⁷ It is all found right here on the opening page: Rusanov's desire to lie his illness away; the privileges he feels entitled to ■ a Party member, yet which are meaningless in the reality of illness and death; his unwillingness to face truth, an unwillingness at once pathetic and wrong. He persists in his denial of truth to the very end, claiming to be cured while the doctors expect him to die within the year.¹⁸ Rusanov is ■ minor character, eclipsed by hero Kostoglotov ("bone-eater") and his love, Dr. "Vega" Gangart whom we also love without reservation. No, there is no "happy ending!" But there is victory and hope in the end.

Is *Cancer Ward* an allegory of Communism? Is Communism itself portrayed here either as ■ "cancer ward," or ■■■ terminal case of spiritual cancer, a gigantic, arrogant, parasitic, fatal fraud? Solzhenitsyn was "criticized for the very title of the story, which is said to deal not with a medical case but with some kind of symbol."¹⁹ He replied with ■ defense of his work as a portrayal of realistic truth:

I do not believe that it is the task of literature to conceal the truth, or to tone it down, with respect either to society or the individual. Rather, I believe that it is the task of literature to tell people the real truth ■ they expect it. Moreover, it is not the task of the writer to defend or criticize one or another mode of distributing the social product, or to defend or criticize one or another form of government organization. The task of the writer is to select more universal and eternal questions, the secrets of the human heart and conscience, the confrontation of life with death, the triumph over spiritual sorrow, the laws of the history of mankind that were born in the depths of time immemorial and that will cease to exist only when the sun ceases to shine.²⁰

Solzhenitsyn is gifted with tremendous realism both in factual description, and in fictional retelling of actual facts. Compare the first chapter of the first volume of *The Gulag Archipelago*, "Arrest," with the moment-by-moment fictional arrest of Innokenty Volodin in *The First Circle*.²¹ Another example is the entire book, *Lenin in Zurich*, where Solzhenitsyn lives and speaks as it were from within Lenin. With him we too enter Lenin's soul, shut up away from normal humanity within the prison hell of his totally self-centered, power-craving plotter's mind that is racked with constant, envious hatred and fear. Only one other is admitted to this hell: Lenin's proud, "liberated" mistress, Inessa Armand.

He acknowledged dependence on no one in the world except Inessa. He felt it least when he was smarting from one of their fights. Most of all, when they were together. No, when they were not . . .²²

Love? Rather, perversion of love — and deliberate abasement of Lenin's wife, plain, dull, loyal Nadya Krupskaya. Of course it does not last:

He couldn't guess where their relationship had gone wrong. Or why. What was there to spoil it? When had he ever tried so hard to please, when had he deferred to anybody as he did to her! . . . He had been surprised that, with the three of them, it had held together so long. But now it had collapsed . . .²³

All others are mere tools, though for a while he might serve as theirs. Typical is Lenin's relationship with Parvus, the conspirator arranging for Lenin's transportation to Russia through Germany:

But now he had high hopes for Lenin, and leaned on him with all his pudgy immensity, forcing him farther and farther along the bed, until he was sitting on the pillow and could feel the bedstead against his elbow.

"Aren't you afraid that mere slogans will be useless without money? With money in your hands — power will be yours. How else will you seize power?" . . .

Lenin was sickened by his self-assurance but fascinated by the reality of his power.²⁴

We are indebted to Solzhenitsyn for his courage in the face of possible torture and death, not only for himself but for his wife and three small children. The wealth of his work and ideas cannot possibly be adequately summarized in this brief tribute. One final consideration must suffice: amazingly, in all Solzhenitsyn's prison novels, none of the heroes escape by suicide! Doggedly, simply, without heroics, though no other way were a human option, his martyrs go on going on, day by day, moment by moment. We marvel at their fathomless patience which, akin to charity, and paired with charity in Solzhenitsyn's Christians, bears all things, believes all things, hopes all things, endures all things, never fails. Yet we dare not say it is contrived; and when we are confronted with the author's explicit testimony on the source of such patient endurance within himself, we dare not doubt its experiential truth, nor that this truth can free everyone, you, me, if we accept and live by it:

How easy it is for me to live with you, Lord!
How easy for me to believe in you.
When my spirit is lost, perplexed and cast down,
When the sharpest can see no further than the night.
And know not what on the morrow they must do.
You give me a sure certainty
That you exist, that you are watching over me
And will not permit the ways of righteousness to be closed to me.
Here on the summit of earthly glory I look back astonished
On the road which through depths of despair has led me here,
To this point from which I can also reflect to men your radiance
And all that I can still reflect — you shall grant to me.
And what I shall fail you shall grant to others.

— Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn²⁵

¹ Niels C. Nielsen, Jr., *Solzhenitsyn's Religion*, Pillar Books, New York, 1976, 151

² Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, *The Gulag Archipelago*, Part Two (Vols. III and IV), Harper & Row, New York, 1975, 615

³ *Ibid.*, 610

⁴ *Ibid.* ⁵ *Ibid.* ⁶ *Ibid.* ⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, *Address in Washington, DC*, on June 30, 1975, published by the AFL-CIO, 851 16th Street NW, Washington, D.C. 20006 (Publication No. 152), 23

⁹ Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, ed., *From Under The Rubble*, Little, Brown & Co., New York, 1975, 274

¹⁰ Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, *Candle in the Wind*, Bantam Books, New York, 1974, 136

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 128

¹² *Ibid.*, 59

¹³ *Ibid.*, 83-85

¹⁴ cf. C.S. Lewis, *The Abolition of Man*, Macmillan Publishing Co., New York, Thirteenth Printing 1975, 13-35

¹⁵ Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, *One Day In The Life of Ivan Denisovich*, Bantam Books, New York, 29th Printing 1976, 49, 120

¹⁶ Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, *The First Circle*, Bantam Books, New York, Fourth Printing 580, 582, 583

¹⁷ Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, *Cancer Ward*, Bantam Books, New York, Fifteenth Printing 1972, 1.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 454

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 554

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 554-555

²¹ Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, *The Gulag Archipelago*, Part One (Vols. I and II), Harper & Row, New York, 1975, 3-23; *The First Circle*, 604-643

²² Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, *Lenin in Zurich*, Farrar, Straus & Giroux, Inc., New York, 1975, 79

²³ *Ibid.*, 234 ²⁴ *Ibid.*, 130-131 ²⁵ Nielsen, *op. cit.*, 19-20

Recent Research Related to Designed Perceptual Capabilities

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For the past couple of years this author has been interested in a particular line of research in Experimental Psychology. This research conducted by many different scientists has yielded findings of great interest to the creationist. The studies demonstrate a remarkable degree of innate readiness in the newborn of many different species, including man. For example, Gene Sackett (1966) experimented with infant rhesus monkeys and found evidence of an innate ability to recognize and react appropriately to at least one social situation. Specifically he found that two- to four-month-old monkeys that had been isolated from birth nevertheless showed signs of fear when exposed to pictures of an angry and threatening adult rhesus monkey. As Sackett concludes, "pictures of threat appear to release a developmentally determined, inborn fear response" (Sackett, 1966).

Studies such as the above are of interest to the creationist because they point to the high degree of complexity and design in the behavior of the newborn. Since the learning factor is largely eliminated in these experiments, greater pressure is placed upon the evolutionary biologist to account for these capacities in terms of random mutation and natural selection. Although evolutionist explanations can be offered they do become quite strained. In the above example, the evolutionist must argue that given the chance development of an instinctive fear of threatening adult gestures, natural selection would tend to favor those individuals possessing the trait. It is a common feature in studies of this type that the suspected innate mechanism can be clearly seen to have survival value for the organism. Thus evolutionary explanations, though at a total loss to explain the origin of the response trait, nevertheless give a plausible account of its spread through the population via natural selection.

It was in this context that the author became particularly excited about one such experiment which seemed to point to an innate response system that would apparently have a survival value in the context of a primeval forest. The experiment in question was part of an important series of studies conducted by T. G. R. Bower (1965).

BOWER'S QUESTION AND METHOD

Bower was basically interested in the question of what the world looks like to a newborn baby. Can he make sense out of it as adults do or is it in the words of William James a "buzzing confusion" that he must learn to understand by a process of trial-and-error? But how does a baby tell us what he

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sees? Obviously he can't speak to us. Bower devised an extremely ingenious way of interrogating infants as young as six weeks of age.

One of the few body actions that an infant can voluntarily control is head turning. He can turn his head as he chooses. Bower devised an apparatus whereby an infant could operate a switch by turning his head. Then Bower played the following game with the child. He would place a particular target object in front of the child. If the little one now turned his head to activate the switch an adult would pop-up giving him a delightful peek-a-boo. However, if anything other than the target object were displayed, no peek-a-boo could be earned. Infants as young as two weeks of age quickly learn the rules of this game, earning peek-a-boos when they are available and not bothering to activate the switch when they are not.

The fact that an infant can learn to respond to a particular target in this manner proves one important thing about them at the outset. They can perceive the target object as distinct from the other items that are placed in front of them. But given that, what will happen if the experimenter begins to change the way in which the target object is displayed? Will the infant show by his responses that he still recognizes the object as being the target? On the other hand, what if the experimenter selects an object which is not the target and presents it in such a way that it might appear similar to the target object? Will the infant be fooled and respond to it the same way as to the target or will he recognize that it is not the same?

For example, Bower taught six- to eight-week-old infants to respond to a small box placed one meter in front of the eyes. Then Bower tested each infant as follows. The same size box was placed three meters in front of the infant. Would he recognize it as the same? Conversely, a box three times the size of the target box was placed one meter from the infant's eyes. Would the infant recognize that it was not the target? The answer is that in this and a number of similar experiments, the infants demonstrated a remarkable ability to recognize the true target and respond to it rather than Bower's carefully contrived substitutes. Bower's results provide a powerful testimony for special creation and are highly recommended. Though an evolutionist himself, many of Bower's stated conclusions seem more compatible with the creation model. For instance, in conclusion to one set of experiments Bower states, "This finding seems very important, since it is a blow not only against empiricism but also against the idea (common to nativists and empiricists) that perception of simple variables is in some way developmentally earlier than perception of complex variables" (Bower, 1965).

The focus of the present paper is an experiment which began by teaching seven- to eight-week-old infants to respond to a triangle which was partially concealed by an iron bar placed across it (see Fig. 1). Following this training, Bower began to test the infants by exposing them to the four objects shown in Fig. 2. These objects were presented one at a time, and the question was which one, if any, would the infants respond to as they had to the target object. In reductionist terms the two lower objects are more similar to the target and, in fact, most people tend to predict that infants will respond most




FIGURE 1




FIGURE 2

strongly to the lower left object. However, Bower found that the infants responded primarily to the true triangle.

One might consider two possible interpretations of this finding. First of all it could be that the infants have an innate perception of a triangle as such. This interpretation would be in line with related research and interpretation by Sackett (1966), Fantz (1961), and Ball and Tronick (1971). However, these previous studies — involving apparent innate species recognition in monkeys (Sackett, 1966) and humans (Fantz, 1961), and of impending collision in humans — Ball and Tronick (1961) are still somewhat amenable to an evolutionary interpretation. For example, the mother's face and collisions with solid objects are presumably present in the historical background of all higher animals as well as man. Furthermore, a high degree of sensitivity to these aspects of life would presumably have survival value. Thus, assuming an evolutionary past, it is possible to conjecture how such innate mechanisms could become prevalent in the gene pool of the surviving population. (It should again be noted that this explanation in no way explains the origin of the innate perception mechanism, but only its increasing prevalence in the species gene pool given that some species members happen to possess the trait.)

However, the situation is very different with the triangle. There are no triangles in the presumed primeval forest. It is a mathematical concept associated with civilized man. That is why this particular finding is so intriguing from a creationist point of view. The creation model can allow the "innate triangle recognition" interpretation as consistent with its premises, but the evolutionary model simply cannot.

The evolution model must rely on a second possible interpretation. Perhaps what is occurring is simply a phenomenon of "completion." In other words,

the simplest way of completing the missing parts of the object is to extend the lines in a way which in the present case happens to result in a triangle. This in fact is the interpretation which Bower gave to the triangle findings. Such an interpretation is quite compatible with the creation model and it still points to a remarkable perceptual sophistication in the newborn infant.

The question is, "Which of these two interpretations is correct?" This author believes the simpler "completion" interpretation is the correct one. To understand the reason why, it is necessary to examine the Ball and Tronick (1971) findings cited earlier. Ball and Tronick found that infants as young as two weeks would show fear and agitation when placed in front of an object moving quickly toward them on a collision path. If the object was moving on a path that would miss the infant or was moving away from him, no fear was shown. This phenomenon is called the "looming effect." What is especially intriguing is that when Ball and Tronick placed a screen between the infant and the object so that only the shadow of it could be seen, the "looming effect" worked exactly as before. That is to say, a symmetrically expanding shadow produced fear and agitation whereas an asymmetrically expanding shadow or a shrinking shadow did not.

The observation of the looming effect to a mere shadow, in the absence of any depth cues, seems to indicate that the infant has an inborn conception of "looming" per se and not merely an instinctive sensitivity to actual objects about to collide with him. In the context of Bower's triangle experiment one might ask what would happen if the experiment were repeated *without* the standard three-dimensional depth cues. If the infant really has a built-in concept of "triangle," then the results should be the same as before. If, however, the simpler completion interpretation is correct, then perhaps he should fail to choose the triangle in the test situation.

Evidence for an inborn triangle concept would be, to say the least, an epistemological bombshell, something akin — in this narrow area of research — to finding Noah's Ark. Fortunately, Bower carried out the necessary experiment to test the hypothesis. He repeated the triangle study exactly as before only this time using photographs instead of the actual objects. In the absence of natural, three-dimensional depth cues the infants no longer "selected" the triangle but responded identically to the four test objects. On the basis of these results it would seem that the completion hypothesis is preferable. It might be explained in the following way. When depth cues are present, the infant's built-in perceptual equipment tells him that the block and triangle are separate objects. The object behind the block is not seen as a triangle per se. However, the perceptual apparatus completes the partially hidden object in the simplest way by extending the appropriate lines thereby forming a triangle precept in this particular case. In the absence of natural three-dimensional depth cues we know from other research that the infant will not respond to the block and triangle as distinct objects. However, if the infant had an innate concept of triangle then perhaps that would cause him to differentiate the block and triangle and respond preferentially to the triangle in the test situation. The fact that he does not, seems to leave the simpler com-

pletion hypothesis as the best available scientific explanation of Bower's results.

CONCLUSION

The Christian approach to scientific investigation and discovery must be very different from that of the nonbeliever. The ideal of secular, humanistic science is ■■■ attitude of noncommitment. As one writer put it, modern ■■■■■ must always be "poised to adjust." His only basic commitment is to non-commitment. He must tolerate everything but intolerance. The only thing he can really be certain of is uncertainty. In contrast, the Christian stance requires ■■■ faith commitment to a single though infinite absolute truth which is Christ. "In the beginning God" is one important aspect of that larger and all encompassing truth.

This, of course, makes for understandable difficulties in communication between believing and nonbelieving scientists. They say, "How can we trust your examination of scientific evidence when you are already committed as to what the answer must be?" There are several ways in which creation scientists have answered this objection. For one thing, they have tried to point out that the evolutionist is, unconsciously at least, subject to the same bias in favor of evolutionary interpretations. As a colleague once told me, "Not believing in evolution is like not believing in gravity." This answer, however, may do little to win the confidence and trust of the secular scientific community. It seems to me that the Lord would have us do what we can to build bridges of communication with our evolutionist friends — "Let us reason together" (Isaiah 1:18).

In the long run there is only one way to build confidence and trust. We must above all be truthful and open and honest: "— God is light, and in him is no darkness at all" (1 John 1:5). "Blessed is the man — in whose spirit there is no guile" (Psalm 32:2). Total and transparent honesty is the only way to fight this battle. I am convinced that if we diligently observe this crucial norm of science and commandment of God that the Lord will honor us and cause our efforts to bear "much fruit." In that vein we may well find that our greatest advances will come not ■■■ a result of the evidences in our favor but rather from our conduct on those occasions where the evidence might offer some comfort for our evolutionist opponents.

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THE FOOTPRINTS OF DRAGONS

Lorella Rouster

Almost all our early ancestors believed the earth was inhabited, especially in unknown regions, by dragons. Where did they get such an idea? Did it stem from a universal human imagination? An inherited need or instinct? An inherited subconscious memory of dinosaurs? All these suggestions have been made, and taken seriously by groups of people. I believe dragons are the reflection, sometimes embellished through retelling but mostly historical, of actual physical encounters of human beings with dinosaurs.

Francis Schaeffer, philosopher-theologian, has written, "I am not at all convinced it has been proven that the dinosaurs became extinct prior to the advent of man. As one thinks of, for example, the fossilized footsteps of man in sites along with the dinosaur tracks in Paluxy, Texas, one can ask whether scientists would not have used this as evidence that man lived at the same time as the dinosaurs were it not for the fact that it contradicts their own theory (of evolution)."¹

I believe there is much evidence, ancient and modern, to indicate that dinosaurs and humankind existed on earth contemporaneously, and that human beings, while they probably lived in different regions than dinosaurs for the most part, did on many occasions encounter the sometimes huge and fearsome creatures. The memories of these encounters were so vivid and deep that they were passed down in a multitude of cultures as legends, painted on cave walls, represented in pottery, and written of in literature.

The word "dragon," according to the *Oxford Dictionary of English*, i.e. etymology, 1966, is derived from the Old French, which in turn was derived from the Latin *dracō* (serpent), which in turn was derived from the Greek *Spakōv* (serpent), from the Greek aorist verb, *Spakēlv* (to see clearly). It is related to many other ancient words related to sight, such as Sanskrit *darc* (see), Avestic *darstis* (sight), Old Irish *derc* (eye), Old English *torht*, Old Saxon *torht* and Old High German *zorahit*, all meaning clear, or bright. The roots of the word can be traced, then, back to most early Indo-European tongues. This may indicate that it is possible the immediate ancestor of the word was a part of the original hypothetical Indo-European tongue which may have been a part of the vocabulary of Japheth's descendants, soon after the Flood and the dispersion at Babel.

The *Oxford English Dictionary* points out that *Spakēlv* is derived from the Greek stem *Spak* meaning strong. The connection with dragons is obvious. According to the *OED*, the word was first used in English about 1220 A.D. It was used in English versions of the Bible from 1340 on.

A modern book, *The Greatest Monsters in the World*, (1975) contains a chapter called "Dragons Everywhere." This title is accurate, because ancient belief in dragons is nearly universal, as far as we can determine from prehistoric art, legend, and the world's most ancient writings.

In art, dragons are a motif used in ancient pottery. The motif appears as

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bowl decorations in China as late as 202 A.D.² In Anne Ross's book, *Pagan Celtic Britain*, is a picture of a pot motif from the ancient Urnfield culture which blossomed in Europe prior to 500 B.C.. The Balts portray a dragon in their animal mask of Barong, a good spirit which is central in their ritual dramatic presentations.

Perhaps the earliest evidence, however, is found in a prehistoric cave at La Baume, Latrone, France. Discovered in 1940 by Siegfried Giedion, some scientists have dated the cave at 20,000 years ago (I do not accept such ancient dates). Peter Costello writes, "dominating the whole scene is a serpent over three metres in length." As Costello notes, this picture of a dragon-like creature "appeared at the very dawn of art."³

At Lydney Park on the banks of Severn in Gloucestershire, England, a mosaic floor of Romano-Celtic origin has been excavated. It appears to be a temple associated with the river cult of Nodens, "the cloud maker." Prominent in the mosaic are two monsters that may be dragons.⁴

In literature, dragons are certainly a virtually universal ancient motif. Dragons are found in the early literature of the English, Irish, Danish, Norse Scandinavians, Germans, Greeks, Romans, Egyptians and Babylonians. Among the American Indians, legends of dragons flourished among the Crees, Algonquins, Onondagas, Ojibways, Hurons, Chinooks, Shoshones, and Alaskan Eskimos.

One of the most famous Danish dragon tales is from "Sigurd of the Volsungs" and concerns "The Slaying of Fafnir." Sigurd, the hero of the epic, is afraid of Fafnir the dragon because his tracks seem great. This surely would have been true of the large dinosaurs, whether the footprints or the sound of their approach was being considered. Sigurd hides in a pit, and when the dragon crawls to the water, he strikes up into its heart. Again, if a man were to slay a large dinosaur, this would be an intelligent way to do it, for one would be out of the way of the creature's powerful tail, and sharp, meat-rending teeth. Probably the head, neck and heart were the only truly deadly areas on the huge body. Most dinosaurs were basically water creatures. Therefore, everything in this scene is totally realistic, and makes good dinosaur-hunting strategy.

Sigurd is afraid he will drown in the dragon's blood, which may be another indication as to the size of the creature. If the dragon had fallen over the mouth of the pit, Sigurd's drowning in its blood would have been a distinct possibility.

As the dragon approaches, it blows poison before it. The dragon talks to Sigurd. In the talking we undoubtedly have some embellishment, but this is not surprising in an early folk tale that was passed down orally for uncounted generations. Sigurd's friend, Regin, cuts out the dragon's heart, and asks Sigurd to roast it and serve it to him. When Regin touches the dragon's blood to his tongue, he understands the speech of birds. Here again we probably have an embellishment, perhaps associating dragons in a symbolic way with wisdom, a frequent association in early literature.

Both the dragon in this early Danish epic and the dragon in the Old English epic, Beowulf, guard a treasure. We can only speculate as to the origin of

this idea. It's possible that ■ dinosaur did in fact make off with some loot, or it's possible that the abode of dinosaurs was so unapproachable that ancient peoples imagined their dens to be loaded with treasures. Did the two dragons come from the same early legend? We do not know.

The unnamed dragon in Beowulf also vomits flames. It is fifty feet long, as measured after its death. As with Fafnir, "earth dwellers much dread him."⁵ He is ■ night creature, associated with evil, and described ■ "smooth" and "hateful."⁶

Greek heroes who are supposed to have slain dragons are Hercules, Apollo, and Perseus. Indeed, the *World Book Encyclopedia* (1973) says "every country had them (dragons) in its mythology." In Greek mythology, a Great Ash Tree, Yggdrasil, which was thought to support the whole universe, had three immense roots. One extended into the region of death, Niflheim, and the dragon Nidhogg perpetually gnawed at the root of the tree. This precarious situation, which seems to place the whole universe at Nidhogg's mercy, perhaps shows the conscious or subconscious deeply rooted fear of the proto-Greeks for dinosaurs, those terrible lizards. If the fearsome creatures were threatening the ancestors of the Greek peoples, one can easily see how such a myth could have developed.

The Egyptians wrote of the dragon Apophis, enemy of the sun god Re. The Babylonians recorded their belief in the monster Tiamat. The Norse people wrote of Lindwurm, guardian of the treasure of Rheingold, who was killed by the hero Siegfried. The Chinese wrote of dragons in their ancient book, *I Ching*, associating the creatures with power, fertility, and well being. They also used dragons in early art, ancient pottery, folk pageantry and dances ■■■ motif. The Aztecs' plumed serpent may have represented ■ hybrid in their thought between ■ dragon and another creature. The pottery of ancient Nazca culture of Peru shows a cannibal monster much like a dragon.⁷

In British Columbia, Lake Sashwap is believed to be home to the dragon Ta Zam-A, and Lake Cowichan to Tsingquaw. In Ontario, Lake Meminisha is the reputed home of a fish-like serpent feared by the Cree Indians. Angoub is the legendary Huron dragon. Hiachuckaluck the dragon believed in by the Chinooks of British Columbia.⁸

Dragons ■■■ so widely accepted ■ part of Irish folklore that Robert Lloyd Praeger, naturalist, says that they are "an accepted part of Irish zoology."⁹ Dr. P.W. Joyce, historian, in his book on Irish place-names, says, "legends of aquatic monsters are very ancient among the Irish people" and shows that many Irish place names resulted from a belief in these dragons.¹⁰

Many theories have been set forth proposing to explain the virtually universal belief in dragons among ancient peoples. Some have seen dragons ■ a product of the human imagination, resulting from fear of the unknown. It has been pointed out that ■ late ■■■ 1600 A.D., maps were decorated about the borders of unknown regions with drawings of dragon-like monsters. In my undergraduate study of literature, one frequent interpretation of archetypes in literature was that people had ■ universal need to believe in these things, that the human subconscious understood at some deep level the same

set of symbols. The most frequent modern interpretation given to myths and archetypes ■■■ symbolic.

Yet many authors have come almost, but not quite to the conclusion that early people encountered dinosaurs and passed down the memory of these encounters in tales of dragons. Peter Costello, who researched Lake Monster legends and alleged sightings in considerable depth, wrote, ". . . as we go through the early accounts of Irish lake monsters we shall find that there is often only ■■■ superficial covering of fancy, often the work of the collectors and that real animals ■■■ clearly behind some of the stories."¹¹

The World Book Encyclopedia (1973) notes "the dragons of legend are strangely like actual creatures that have lived in the past. They are much like the giant reptiles which inhabited the earth long before man is supposed to have appeared on earth."¹²

Peter Costello presents the same problem. "The plesiosaur theory," he writes, "which appeared early on, still has many supporters. . . . but again the difficulties, whether it could have survived for sixty million years undetected . . . are very great."¹³

Daniel Cohen, author of *The Greatest Monsters in the World*, also says that there is ■■■ "sensational possibility" that the dragon legend originated with the dinosaurs, observing that:

no creatures that ever lived looked more like dragons than dinosaurs . . . there is ■■■ problem with this theory. The problem is time.

As far ■■■ we know, all the dinosaurs died out over 70 million years ago. That long ago, there were no people on earth. So who could remember the dinosaurs?¹⁴

Cohen says that "some early discoverers of dinosaur bones called them 'dragon bones.'" But apparently because the time and evolutionary development problems are so great in the minds of some, Cohen boldly asserts that "scientists today ■■■ longer identify dinosaurs with dragons."¹⁵

Only two years after the publication of *Greatest Monsters*, however, Carl Sagan, ■■■ renowned astronomer, published *The Dragons of Eden*, which in spite of the time and evolutionary development problems asks, "Could there have been man-like creatures who actually encountered Tyrannosaurus Rex?"¹⁶ Sagan asserts, "One way or another, there were dragons in Eden."¹⁷ Admittedly ■■■ evolutionist, Sagan's book is subtitled, "Speculations on the Evolution of Human Intelligence." He does not view Eden in the classical Christian or Biblical sense of the word; by "Eden" he means ■■■ emerging humanity's dawning awareness of their existence. And he doesn't say human beings, but "man-like creatures" encountered dinosaurs. But this is quite ■■■ step in the thinking of those tied to their evolutionary time scale.

For the Bible believing creationist, of course, no time or evolutionary problems exist, and the facts of literature, art, and geology square very nicely with the Scriptural account. According to Genesis 1:21-23, water animals were created on the fifth day; according to Genesis 1:24-25, land animals, as well as man and woman, were created on the sixth day. Thus, according to the Bible all animals were created ■■■ approximately the same time. There were no long ages when ■■■ was not present and when dinosaurs ruled the earth. The Au-

thorized Version contains the word "dragon" sixteen times, all in the Old Testament, rendering two Hebrew words which mean "sea or land monster."

But perhaps more certain are some Biblical references which use other names but which clearly describe dinosaurs. In Job 40:15ff, for example, Behemoth is described: "His strength is in his loins, and his force is in the navel of his belly" (40:16). Behemoth is a huge creature, and reading of it, one schooled in early literature can scarcely help but think of Fafnir, the dragon of early Danish fame. Behemoth, we read, moved his tail like a cedar. A tail as huge and powerful as a cedar tree can describe no animal on earth but a dinosaur. "His bones are as strong pieces of brass; his bones are like bars of iron" we read (40:18), perhaps recalling Sigurd, trembling because of the strength of the dragon Fafnir. When the author of Job writes "he that made him can make his sword to approach unto him," can the writer mean that only God is normally able to bring about the death of such a powerful creature? Again, I mentally envision Sigurd hiding in the pit, waiting for just the right moment to strike at one of the few places the dragon was vulnerable. Behemoth is a water creature, for "he lieth under the shady trees, in the covert of the reed, and fens . . . the willows of the brook compass him about" (40:22). This creature has a huge thirst, for "he drinketh up a river" (40:23). What animal other than a dinosaur can Behemoth be?

In the next chapter of Job, we read of another great creature, Leviathan. As with Behemoth, the record tells of God describing these creatures, and implies that Job was familiar with them. God is reminding Job of the great difficulty in catching a creature like Leviathan. God had created Leviathan, for He declares, "whatsoever is under the whole heaven is mine" (41:11). Leviathan has terrible teeth and scales or a strong, protective covering, typical of many dinosaurs. Do you see Sigurd trembling before Fafnir when you read, "When he (Leviathan) raiseth himself up, the mighty are afraid" (41:25)? Job is usually considered to be one of the oldest of the Bible books, possibly written when ice covered large parts of Europe and North America shortly after the Great Flood. Many Bible scholars feel that some dinosaurs may have survived the Flood, being water creatures, but that due to severe climactic changes, they died out within a few generations after the Flood. If these small-brained creatures were experiencing hardships to which they were unaccustomed and ill-adapted, one can easily understand why a tradition of monstrous, fearsome dragons is recorded in virtually all early western cultures, which would have developed during or shortly following the time of Job.

It is true that eastern traditions have not viewed the dragon as fearsome and evil, as have western cultures. We can only speculate as to the reason, but it is possible that the eastward migrating peoples simply did not have the gruesome encounters that their western contemporaries must have experienced. If so, these peoples may have told their children stories of dinosaurs as they were handed down from before the Flood, when life was ideally adapted to their existence, food was plentiful, and perhaps animals and humans did not kill each other for food (Gen. 9:3).

The documentary film, *Footprints in Stone* asks the question, "Did man

and dinosaur walk on your distant shore?" There, in the river bed and underlying the banks of the Paluxy River at Glen Rose, Texas, human and dinosaur footprints were fossilized in the ~~same~~ strata. They ~~were~~ too numerous, too well preserved, to dismiss as ~~a~~ unexplainable freak. Scientists who accept evolutionary concepts and the necessary accompanying billions of years of ages have a hard time with this geological evidence, just as they have difficulty with the literary, legendary, and archaeological evidence. How could the footprints of dinosaurs remain soft enough so that millions of years later men could record their footprints around and even in them? How could they endure that without erosion? How could people draw pictures of dinosaurs on ancient cave walls, if none were around? Why did so many cultures write about dinosaurs, if they were unknown to early humanity? These difficulties seem incapable of solution to believers in evolution. To those who take the Bible seriously as an historical record of time-space events, however, there is simply no problem.

The evidence is overwhelming. Scientists often argue that if evidence can be adduced from ~~a~~ number of different disciplines, it is strong indication to the veracity of ~~a~~ hypothesis. I have shown evidence from archaeology, prehistoric art, ancient literature, legend and mythology, geology and paleontology, and the Bible.

This evidence leads me to the conclusion that human beings from the early Indo-European peoples ~~on~~ did indeed encounter dinosaurs in the early earth, and that they drew them, wrote of them and told of them in records known ~~as~~ dragons.

- 1 Francis A. Schaeffer, *No Final Conflict* (Downers Grove, IL., 1975), p. 27.
- 2 *The Ancients* (Charles E. Merill Publishing Company, c. Aldus Books Ltd., London, 1968).
- 3 Peter Costello, *In Search of Lake Monsters* (New York: Coward McCann and Geoghegan, 1974), pp. 279-280.
- 4 *Ibid.*, p. 279.
- 5 *Beowulf: A New Translation*, Tr. by E. Talbot Donaldson (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1966), p. 40.
- 6 *Ibid.*
- 7 *Encyclopedia Americana*, 1969 ed., s.v. "Dragon," by Erika Bourguignon.
- 8 Costello, pp. 220-227.
- 9 *Ibid.*, p. 154.
- 10 *Ibid.*
- 11 *Ibid.*, p. 156.
- 12 *Ibid.*, p. 265.
- 13 *Ibid.*, p. 284.
- 14 Daniel Cohen, *The Greatest Monsters in the World* (New York: Archway, 1975), p. 78.
- 15 *Ibid.*, p. 79.
- 16 Carl Sagan, *The Dragons of Eden* (New York: Random House, 1977), p. 142.
- 17 *Ibid.*, p. 141.

The following poem was submitted by Colonel Donohoo's granddaughter, Amy M. Donohoo. The story on how this came to pass is contained in this month's editorial to the CSSHS Quarterly. The late Colonel Donohoo was a veteran of World War's I and II. The last five years of his military service were spent serving as Senior Chaplain at Billings General Hospital, Ft. Benjamin, in Harrison, Indiana.

THE GREAT TRILOGY

Whence came we?
From ooze and slime
Through aeons of time
By caprices of chance alone:
Or from noble design
By an Infinite Mind
As conceived on Eternity's
Throne?

Why are we here?
To spend our days
In dubious ways
Sans the aid of a worthy goal;
Or to live by the plan
Of the Servant of Man
That presages salvation of
soul?

Whither are we going?
To dreamless dust
To swirl or to crust
At the elements' random mood;
Or to Joy or Despair
To eternally fare
By the measure of Calvary's
Road?

THE EPILOGUE

I laid me down in silent night
Beneath the Heavens fair;
And gazing up my raptured
soul
Did read the answers there.

David D. Donohoo, Sr., Colonel, USA

BOOK REVIEW*

PSYCHOLOGY AS RELIGION: THE CULT OF SELF-WORSHIP.

Paul C. Vitz. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans. 1977. Pp. 149. Paperback, \$3.95

Paul C. Vitz, Associate Professor of Psychology, New York University, has written a book that all students should read, if they want to know about the origins of "sensitivity training," "transactional analysis," and other personal therapy techniques that involve the "touch, feel, and squeeze" syndrome. *Psychology as Religion: The Cult of Self-Worship* summarizes the basic views of Erich Fromm, Carl Rogers, Abraham Maslow, and Rollo May, the leading proponents of "humanistic psychology." Vitz argues that the work of these theorists ■ neither valid as psychology ■ acceptable ■ scientific inquiry. On the contrary, their work should be viewed as the foundation of a new religious cult.

Vitz begins his study with ■ brief biographical sketch of each of the four major proponents of what he terms "self-theory," noting that all were influenced by a similar set of circumstances as they grew to maturity ■ scholars. The most important single factor they had in common was their sharp reaction to traditional Christianity. Rogers and May adopted this stance while studying at New York's Union Theological Seminary. All except Fromm studied in New York at Columbia University and/or Union Theological Seminary. Later in the book, Vitz points out that the religious climate in New York at that time was dominated by two pop-theologians, Harry Emerson Fosdick and Norman Vincent Peale, both strong advocates of self-help and the "power of positive thinking." Vitz is convinced that the philosophical roots of Fromm, Rogers, May and Maslow ■■■ not much more refined beyond the general views of Fosdick and Peale.

Following the sketches of these writers, Vitz traces their influence ■ it flowed into the mainstream of culture through their own writings and through the works of their students. Thus we see the emergence of "encounter groups," Eric Berne's *Games People Play*, and other forms of transactional analysis, including *I'm OK - You're OK*. More recently, ■ more aggressive version of the self-theory appeared in Ringer's *Winning Through Intimidation*. Last, but not least, is Vitz's evaluation of "est," Erhard Seminar Training. The clear message in these popular versions of self-theory is that there is something for everyone in them, ■ characteristic of ■ religious movement rather than a therapeutic psychology.

Vitz next examines the methodology of these writers and concludes that it has no basis in scientific fact, though the writers would have their readers believe that it was, indeed, scientific. On the contrary, says Vitz, it is a new religion and ought to be regarded ■ one. "Selfism is ■ superficial theory causing occasional short-term positive effects in people who are already healthy." (p.39) As for the imagined scientific base, Vitz points out that Maslow did not even take the trouble to ■■■ a control group ■ he developed his famous "self-actualizing" theory! (P.41) Further, focus ■ positive factors leads Vitz

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to observe that "they rarely ever discuss the problem of self-expression that leads to exploitation, narcissism, and sadism." (P.45) Examination of such negative factors would, no doubt undermine the generally positive flavor the selfists want to maintain.

Turning to the question of the philosophical basis for this movement, Vitz observes first that these writers "fail adequately to define or characterize their central concept - self." (P.51) In his opinion, they have no idea how it relates to the classical philosophical inquiries concerning the self. Vitz shows that the selfists are woefully short in their understanding of their own philosophical roots. They give no indication whether they intend to operate in the existentialist tradition, or some other tradition of philosophy. In the same vein, they do not realize the implications of their assumptions - that man is essentially good and that he is perfectible. Obviously, Karl Menninger's *Whatever Happened to Sin?*, written to his colleagues a few years ago, has had no impact on the leaders of the selfish school of personality. Menninger intended to raise the question of the essential goodness of man, by arguing that any theory of personality without it was in error.

Vitz notes, further, that in philosophical terms this movement represents itself as scientific and as an ethic, or world-view. On this point he states that "the claim that self-theory is a science is invalid by any useful meaning of the term 'science.'" (P. 55) Vitz continues, "a related weakness is the tendency of the selfists to imply that psychology as a science has somehow verified the values of this system." But, says Vitz, how do you demonstrate scientifically the intrinsic goodness of the self?

He argues forcefully that the superficial theories of selfism have become the basis of a new creed for youth culture in our time. He cites evidence, developed by C.F. Allison, which documents this change in the language in recent years. "I feel," "I know," "I think," have all but replaced a more objective frame of reference, a point college teachers know all too well. Self-orientation is the perfect creed for a consumer society, says Vitz. Indeed, evidence is abundant that advertisers exploit this view consciously.

The result of the rapid growth of the self-theory view has led to a depreciation of the family and the isolation of the individual, says Vitz. These are destructive developments because the individual must always view himself as part of basic communities, such as the family. The Parent in *I'm OK - You're OK* is pictured as a negative influence, and it takes little imagination to carry over this lesson to the actual conditions of the family. Other self-theory books have the same tendency. The O'Neil's *Open Marriage*, while not explicitly condoning exchanges of sexual partners, suggests that the fully developed self will not be troubled by such activity on the part of one's spouse. If you understand correctly, you will realize that the self is more important than relationships, even those you have with your spouse.

Finally, concludes Vitz, self-theory is idolatry. It stands in absolute contradiction to the root Christian ethic, namely, love God above all, and your neighbor as your self. In this view the individual is number three, not number one as the self-theorists argue. Self-theory asks a person to idolize himself at

the expense of others. How can a person "seek first the Kingdom and its righteousness," if he is asked to seek the actualization of the self first? Could Vitz's point be more obvious?

Vitz's study is addressed to all people, Christian and non-Christian alike. Yet, he calls upon reflective Christians to evaluate the place of self-theory in contemporary society. It is time, he argues, for people to recognize that self-theory is not psychology at all; rather, it must be judged as the latest fad in the ever-increasing number of religious cults.

L. John Van Til

EDITORIAL

(cont. from p. 1)

occurrence. As stated earlier, we pray that the *Quarterly* will be a missionary outreach to intellectual non-believers. We hope to communicate the Gospel to them in their own language. But we seek to do this not so much by speaking to them directly, but by speaking to you brothers and sisters in Christ within their hearing. We want to let them eavesdrop on our discussions so to speak.

For this reason I believe it is important that we avoid fine topics of theological debate. Our non-believing intellectual friends will have plenty of time to consider these issues once they are brought into Christ's body. We also wish to avoid inflammatory rhetoric as much as possible. (A missionary does not start out by insulting the people he is coming to.) Finally, we want to try and observe, in so far as is right, the norms and practices of the academic community we are trying to reach. (For example, one principal norm in current academic writing is always to understate your case. You don't say, "Two plus two is four," but rather, "Mathematicians are increasingly confident that two plus two is four.")

In closing I want to pray to our Lord that He will cause this journal to help believers be more confident in the intellectual profundity of the faith and be better able to articulate an academically sound defense of the faith. By His grace may we help our Christian readers be able to more effectively communicate the Gospel of Christ in love to this generation. We hope to publish articles that are firm but gentle, intellectually solid but easy to understand. God grant that it may be so.

Yours in Christ,
Paul D. Ackerman
Editor

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